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Abstract: 
Twice Indian blackouts occurred at the end of July in 2012 left 
over 600 million of people in the dark for several hours. In these 
two-day, Indian grid disturbances were regarded as the most serious 
and large-scale blackout in the world in history. A report has been 
generated by the enquiry committee which was organized by the 
Ministry of Power, Government of India, to investigate the factors 
which led to the initiation of the grid disturbance. Recommendations 
were also generated by the committee in order to provide the plan 
for Indian grid enhancement. Further to the recommendations by 
Enquiry Committee, this paper will give further suggestions to 
minimize blackouts in future. An insight into decision support 
requirement for power network operation will be made. 
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1. Introduction 
Three of the Indian grids were hit by power failure twice, 
leaving a huge disturbance in the country on 30th and 31st 
July 2012. The power outage affected 620 million people in 
India [1]. Trains were stopped, and a large number of 
passengers were stranded on the platform. Traffic congestion 
was in large cities including New Delhi and Kolkata due to 
traffic light problems. Government employers were told to go 
home as the Chief Minister claimed that power would be 
restored 10 to 12 hours later [2]. It was claimed that the 
Prime Minister of India, Manmohan Singh urgently attended 
the issue to attract $400 million to invest on the grid and 
release the burden due to lack of electricity which is holding 
back economic growth [3]. Moreover, India will import 
electricity from Tala, Bhutan to relieve the pressure from 
heavy loading [4]. Government of India has agreed to support 
Bhutan to develop hydro power and will purchase no less 
than 10000 MW of the power from Bhutan by 2020 [5]. 
Throughout the India grid history, Northern Region grid 
of Indian was collapsed on 2nd January, 2001. Power failure 
hit the Northern Region grid when officials claimed that a 
fault in the transmission system caused the darkness in the 
northern region [6, 7]. In 2012, the fIrst blackout was 
occurring at around 2:35 am on 30th July in the Northern 
Region grid, which feeds electricity to 9 states of Northern 
India. Approximately 36000 MW was affected in this 
blackout. Only 60 % of load in Northern Region was restored 
by 11 :00 am by means of hydroelectricity in the Northern 
Region and withdrawing power from Eastern and Western 
Regions. And the Northern Region grid was not supplied with 
the full load until 7:00 pm. Afterwards, on 31st July, there 
was another disturbance occurring at 1 :00 pm, almost 
covering the entire power grid in India, including Northern 
Region, Eastern Region and Northeastern Region. Only some 
of the small areas were not affected, such as Narora. There 
were about 48000 MW of the total loads affected in the 
second blackout, which was much more serious than the fIrst 
one. It was reported that over 700 million people in India was 
suffered from darkness and manufacturing slowdown. Some 
important loads like hospital services were affected [6, 8]. As 
a matter of fact, the reasons for the collapsing of India power 
grid are not unique. Although Indian grid has its rule on a 
rational tariff structure on power supply [9], relay 
mal-operation and incorrect setting, high loading due to high 
temperature and high reactive power consumption in the 
circuit happened on several occasions over the past few years 
[10]. In accordance to CEA (Central Electricity Authority) of 
India, 27% of the power was lost in transmission or stolen so 
that the gap between peak supply and demand was 
maintained at 9% of the total capacity [11]. 
In 2011, power losses owing to transmission and 
distribution issues were approximately 23.7% on average in 
India, while the value was around 10-15% in Europe and 
North America [12]. A weak monsoon was blamed as lacking 
of rain and decelerating the hydro power generation [13]. In 
terms of India Meteorological Department, the actual rainfall 
in June, July and August in India were much less than 
expected normal rainfall in these three months in 2012 [12]. 
Furthermore, because of the price control on coal by Indian 
Government, some coal fIre plants could not afford such 
expensive coal importation and left their power stations 
operating below capacity for their own interests [11]. Also, 
some experts blamed the disturbance due to the Indian grid 
infrastructure, which connects with both AC and DC 
transmission lines. The grids can exchange power with other 
region flexibly when only DC transmission cables connected 
between regions under normal operation. In addition, faults in 
one region are difficult to spread into others in abnormal 
conditions. Indian grid cannot take advantage from the 
benefits which bring security effects from only DC 
connection. 
An Enquiry Committee had been founded to investigate 
the factors which led to the causes of the two grid 
disturbances on both days, and a report had been generated to 
investigate the situation and gave some critical 
recommendations [8]. One of the most serious problems was 
that the transmission system was very weak since the grid 
suffered from multiple outages. Besides, the Northern Region 
loads withdrew too much power from the Western Region 
grid so that the corridor linked between north and west was 
overloaded. Ineffective dispatch cannot prevent the Northern 
part from 'overload' electricity from the Western part. 
Without any fault occurring, zone 3 of the distance relay 
protecting the Bina-Gwalior link was tripped, and caused 
Western Region separated from Northern Region. 
This paper will give a simulation to demonstrate and 
prove the reasons described above and a model with both 
HYDC and AC transmission lines was established in 
DIgSIELNT software Package [14] to find better solutions to 
improve the India grid security. Comparisons between grids 
with HVDC and grids with AC only will be made. Sensitivity 
analysis will be conducted to find out in what level, the 
generators in the Northern grid will be out of step when 
overdrawing power from the north. 
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Figure 1. Brief Indian NEW grid for disturbance study 
2. Model development 
In this paper, a brief model was built for simulating the 
grid behavior during the disturbance with PowerFactory 
DIgSILENT software Package. As stated in the Enquiry 
Committee Report and some media, Northern Region grid 
imported energy from all the rest of NEW grid (Eastern 
Region, Western Region and Northeastern Region) before the 
disturbance occurrence. Besides, Bhutan, a country located at 
Northeast of India, also imported 1127 MW from the Eastern 
Region of Indian grid. The pre-disturbance generation and 
demand with power importing and exporting conditions on 
30th July in 2012 02:00 am are shown in Table 1. It is worth 
noting that few lines had been tripped few hours before the 
collapse happening [15]. Each region in the NEW grid which 
was involved in the disturbance had been grouped by a 
general load and some generation types such as thermal, 
hydro, nuclear and renewables. 
Figure 1 illustrates the India NEW grid model for 
analyzing the scenarios of the grid disturbance in DigSIELNT 
software package. The Northern Region and the Western 
Region were connected by both 400 kV circuit lines from 
Agra to Gwalior and Zerda to Kankroli, and 220 kV circuit 
lines from Badod to Kota. All lines were assumed to have the 
same parameters. Each region of these four in the simulation 
was modeled for hydro, thermal and renewables generations 
and one load. Eastern Region grid was connected to both 
Northern Region grid and Western Region grid by AC 
transmission line. Northeastern Region grid comprised of 
hydro, thermal and renewable generations which were 
connected to Eastern Region grid only. 
TABLE 1. GENERATION AND DEMAND CONDITIONS WIlli POWER IMPORT 
AND EXPORT BEFORE DISTURBANCES 
Region Generation Demand Import 
(MW) (MW) (MW) 
Northern 32636 38322 5686 
Eastern 12452 12213 -239, (1127 
MW to Bhutan) 
Western 33024 28053 -6229 
Northeastern 1367 1314 -53 
Total 79479 79479 
Table 2 Illustrates the pre-dIsturbance generatlOn power 
allocated in each region according to the enquiry report. The 
installed capacities of generations for each region were: 
1. Northern Region: 
19830 MW hydro generations, 34608 MW thermal 
generations 1620 MW nuclear generations; 
2. Eastern Region: 
3882 MW hydro generations, 22545 MW thermal 
generations and 411 MW from renewable energy sources; 
3. Western Region: 
7448 MW hydro generations, 49402 MW thermal 
generations, 1840 MW nuclear generation and 7909.95 MW 
from renewable energy sources; 
4. Northeastern Region: 
1200 MW hydro generations, 2454.94 MW thermal 
generations and 228 MW from renewable energy sources 
TABLE 2. GENERATION POWER ALLOCATION IN EACH REGION 
� North Northeast East Generations 
Hydro 10000 MW 267 MW 2000 MW 
Thermal 21636 MW 1000 MW 10200 MW 
Nuclear 1000 MW - -
Renewable - 100 MW 252 MW 
Total 32636 MW 1367 MW 12452 MW 
3. Case Study 







As can be seen in the Enquiry Committee report, load in 
the Northern Region were larger than power generated, which 
means the Northern Region needs to import power from other 
regions unless there is a load shedding in the Northern 
Region. Besides, automatic voltage regulator (AV R) in the 
India grid could control the voltage level for some degrees. In 
this case, a sensitivity analysis was carried out to find out at 
what level the generators in Northern Region grid will have 
pole slipping with the Western Region. Another important 
task is to make a comparison between grids with AV R inside 
generators and without AV R. 
A. Sensitivity analysis 
The aim of the sensitivity analysis is to find out at what 
level the increased load will lead to generators in Northern 
Region out of step with the rest of the NEW grid. The 
increased level of reactive power of the load in the Northern 
Region is fixed at 5 %. The increased level of active power is 
changed from 1 % to 5 % with a step size of 0.5 %, with 
minimum and maximum value of frequency in the Northern 
Region and Western Region recorded in Table 3. Pole slip 
had been pointed out in the table that when Northern Region 
grid active power was increased by 3.5 % and reactive power 
was increased by 5 %, generators in the Northern Region 
were out of step. Gaps between maximum and minimum 
value for both Northern Region and Western Region grid 
frequency were getting larger in terms of the increased 
Northern Region load. 
TABLE 3. RESULTS OF SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS FOR LOAD INCREASED IN 
NORTIIERN REGION 
Frequency in the 






1% 49.990 50.007 
1.5 % 49.985 50.011 
2% 49.979 50.016 
2.5% 49.974 50.024 
3% 49.969 50.040 
3.5% 49.712 50.231 
4% 49.985 50.241 
4.5% 49.669 50.258 
5% 49.663 50.281 
B. Applying A VR into the grid
Frequency in the Pole 
Western Region grid Slip 
Min Max 
49.997 50.007 No 
49.995 50.011 No 
49.994 50.016 No 
49.993 50.024 No 
49.992 50.040 No 
49.965 50.545 Yes 
49.966 50.535 Yes 
49.966 50.522 Yes 
49.972 50.518 Yes 
The role of the Automatic Voltage Regulator is to 
control the magnitude of the terminal voltage of the 
generators. In the next scenario, typical AV Rs for 1981 IEEE 
Type STl Excitation System [14] had been added into the 
generators in the grid. Figures 2 demonstrated the grid 
behaviors on increasing Northern Region load by 3.5 % for 
both active and reactive power when the grid had no AV Rs, 
while Figure 3 demonstrated the grid behaviors on increasing 
Northern Region load by 5 % for both active and reactive 
power when the grid had AV Rs . It is not very difficult to find 
out that the generators of the Northern Region in the grid 
with AV Rs were not out of step with the rest of the regions, 
whereas the generators without AV Rs had pole slipping when 
the load was changed only by 3.5 %. After the Northern 
Region grid increased the load, the grid with AV Rs could still 
operate, with the frequency stabilized at 49.97 Hz. The grid 
with AV Rs was much more stable than the one without AV Rs. 
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frequency in the Northern Region was stabilized at 50 Hz as 
the fault had been cleared after 0.15 s. Because of the 
distance between north and west, the impact by the fault 
occurred in the Northern Region was much smaller than that 
in the Western Region. The frequency was only increased by 
0.05 Hz, and after about 10 seconds, it recovered back to 50 
Hz. 
50030 --------------r-------------,--------------;----------
____ :� _____ ��] _____ �oo [d� rc;--------� -  1--- - - - - - -- - r -----------r 








, ----------i: :,-50.10 -------------+------------�--------------:--- ---- - --r-------------i  49.90 ---------------,i -------------i--------------:,----- -----, -------------1, ·80 0 20 (0) 40 r, 1 6� 




oo �;H;� I 
[Hz] i ' i i 0 20 40 [51 60 
50.40 -------------t-------------i--------------j----- -----�-------------! 5 0 , 0011- -;r= ------- -j- -- -Ql2 - -� - -=1-- - - ---j -,= ---=; -----
. 
-� - - .-1 -i-i : : : : 
50.20 -------------t-------------�--------------i---- -- - ----�-------------j 4�H9� i : : 
::: :0!;------ --�201o ' o-----,';;---------;'n-- ----,8!oo------.::r------.--t.l� :: :: ;;J;=S=:J 
(c) 
Figure 2. The grid behavior «a)Rotor angle of the Northern Region 
thermal, (b)Northern Region Frequency, (c)Western Region Frequency) on 
increasing Northern Region load by 3.5 % in both active and reactive power 
when grid withoutAVRs 
Case 2. Comparisons between models with HVDC only, 
HVAC only and model with both DC and AC connected 
In this case, the impacts from HYDC had been 
considered to give recommendations on grid enhancement 
and expansion. 500 kV CIGRE HV DCs were connected to 
the system between each region. Short-circuit events are 
simulated for models with HVDC only, AC transmission lines 
only and models with both HVDC and AC transmission lines. 
Load events on Northern Region grid are emulated on models 
as well in order to compare among the models. 
A. Short-circuit events 
Short circuit event occurred in the Northern Region grid, 
had been considered in this case. A 3-phase short-circuit fault 
was considered. It had a resistance of 0.1 Q and reactance of 
1 Qat 3sec and the fault was cleared after 0.15 sec. Changes 
in frequency at the Northern Region and Western Region had 
been observed. As seen in Figures 4 (a) and (b), the grid was 
connected by ac transmission line, the frequency in the 
Northern Region was increased by 0.24 Hz since the fault 
occurred in the Northern Region. After few seconds, the 
(c) 
Figure 3. The grid behavior «a)Rotor angle of the Northern Region 
thermal, (b)Northern Region Frequency, (c)Western Region Frequency) on 
increasing Northern Region load by 5 % in both active and reactive power 
when grid with AVRs 
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Figure 4. Frequency changes at (a) Northern Region and (b) Western 
Region when 3-phase short-circuit fault occurred in Northern Region of the 
grid with only AC transmission connection 
The same scenario had been simulated in the grid with 
regions connected by 500 kV HYDCs, with the results of the 
frequency changes demonstrated in Figures 5 (a) and (b). In 
Figure 5 (a), the frequency in Northern Region dropped under 
49.5 Hz. After around 90 seconds the frequency in the B. Effects due to load change 
Northern Region only recovered back to 49.86 Hz. However, The Northern Region load was increased by 5 % for 
for the Western Region, from Figure 5 (b), the frequency was both reactive and active power in both AC models and 
increased to 50.88 Hz and remained on a new level owing to HYDC models at 5 sec. As discussed in case 1, the generators 
the isolation of the HYDCs. Also, a model with both HYDC in the Northern Region had pole slipping. Figures 7 (a) and (b) 
and AC transmission lines were compared to the models with illustrated the behavior of the Northern and Western Region 
HYDC only and AC transmission lines only. A CIGRE 500 frequency in the AC models. The frequency of the grid with 
kV HYDC model was applied between the Western and HYDCs was shown in Figures 8 (a) and (b). The generators 
Northern Region to replace two of the seven parallel AC in the Northern Region were out of step with the rest regions 
transmission lines as shown in Figure 1, which were in the grid. The difference between the frequency behaviors 
supplying 1063 MW power before the disturbance occurred. in the two models was that the frequency in the Western 
Frequency changes at Northern Region and Western Region Region did not change too much. Security of the grid had 
when 3-Phase short-circuit fault occurred in Northern Region been improved by applying HYDCs between regions. While 
of the grid were depicted in Figures 6 (a) and (b). In Figure 6, in Figures 9 (a) and (b), which showed that the effects in 
the frequency in Western Region grid still recovered back to frequency when Northern Region load increased in grid with 
50 Hz because of the AC connections. both HYDC and AC transmission connected, the fluctuations 
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indicated that Generators in Northern Region were out of step 
from the rest of the grid. Furthermore, the systems were 
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Figure 5. Frequency changes at (a) Northern Region and (b) Western 
Region when 3-phase short-circuit fault occurred in Northern Region of the 
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Figure 7. Frequency changes at (a) Northern Region and (b) Western Region 
with only AC transmission connection when northern load increased in both 
of active and reactive power by 5 % 
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Figure 6. Frequency changes at (a) Northern Region and (b) Western 
Region when 3-phase short-circuit fault occurred in Northern Region of the 




Figure 8. Frequency changes at (a) Northern Region and (b) Western 
Region with only HYDC transmission connection when northern load 
increased in both of active and reactive power by 5 % 
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Figure 9. Frequency changes at (a) Northern Region and (b) Western 
Region with both HYDC and AC transmission connection when Northern 
Region load increased in both of active and reactive power by 5 % 
4. Conclusions 
This paper discussed the reasons for the blackout occurred 
on 30th and 31st July 2012. The problem for the Indian grid 
applying both HYDC and AC transmission line had been 
investigated. Scenarios on grid with and without Automatic 
Voltage Regulator (AV R) had been simulated with a brief 
model established in DIgSILENT Software Package. Different 
grid behavior between using HYDC and AC transmission line 
during Northern Region had been discussed. This paper is not 
dealing with reliability. However, the authors look forward to 
some publications along this line. Naturally, the inclusion of 
capacitor banks and SVCs at key substations will be required. 
Frequency variation is an important indicator for the system 
security assessment. In this paper the frequency performance 
gave a good indication for the system stability. Sensitivity 
analysis on Northern and Western Region frequency had been 
considered to investigate the load level in the Northern Region 
where pole slipping would occur. Based on the simulation, 
some recommendations will be made to the India grid. Firstly, 
applying A V Rs inside the generators could make the system 
more stable. Secondly, HYDC and HV AC need to be 
coordinated properly to minimize power system instability. 
HYDC should mainly be focused for electricity transmission 
while HY AC for interconnection use. This paper has given an 
insight into decision support requirement for power network 
operation and will make a contribution to practical design for 
modem power grid. 
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